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Globalisation and monetary operations 




Globalisation has encouraged a convergence of monetary policy operating procedures in emerging 
market economies towards market-based instruments. The progressive easing of capital controls and 
the development of debt markets have undermined interest rate controls. The liberalisation of foreign 
borrowing has made quantitative loan limits on domestic banks less effective in restraining overall 
borrowing by firms. This trend towards market-based procedures has gone hand in hand with greater 
transparency and more explicit signalling of changes in the stance of monetary policy. This evolution 
parallels that in policy objectives towards inflation targeting (Table 1). 
The influence of globalisation on operating procedures (controls versus market-based policies, 
quantities versus interest rates, short- versus medium-term rates) is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 
considers how operating procedures may need to be modified under exceptional circumstances. Some 
ways for central banks to improve liquidity in the markets in which they operate are set out in 
Section 4. The final section examines how central banks can best extract information about market 
expectations, and the extent to which globalisation may be making this harder. 
2.  Main issues in operating procedures 
Direct controls or market-based policies? 
Monetary policy generally used to be implemented through direct controls on banks. Maximum (and 
sometimes minimum) interest rates were set on various classes of deposits and loans, banks were 
required to hold (often large) proportions of their assets in government securities (or on deposit with 
the central bank) and limits were placed on how quickly they could expand their loan books.
2 But using 
such controls involved what Bisignano (1996) has termed “balancing monetary objectives with market 
efficiency”. The controls reduced the efficiency of financial markets in various ways, such as by limiting 
the scope for competition within the banking industry. Financial repression that keeps interest rates 
low may also discourage saving, or shift it from the regulated financial instrument system into other 
assets such as equities and real estate, or drive it offshore. 
These controls also became ineffective over time. Intermediation prevented from occurring through 
banks would instead take place through bank-like intermediaries such as building societies, savings 
and loan associations, finance companies and merchant banks. Sometimes these were affiliates of the 
banks, which directed customers to them. If the central bank responded by bringing these 
intermediaries under the regulatory net, new institutions would again spring up outside it. 
Financial innovation and globalisation have led most central banks to operate monetary policy by 
influencing conditions in the market for bank reserves. But there are still some exceptions. For 
instance, in China the central bank still sets bands for interest rates on many bank deposit and loan 
products although rates in the bank reserves and bond markets are now market-determined. 
                                                       
1  Thanks to Claudio Borio, Corrinne Ho, Ramon Moreno, Peter Stebbing, Nick Talbot and Philip Turner for helpful comments. 
2  Such controls also often involved instructions on the sectors to which loans were made. Brazil and India still require banks 
to use a set proportion of their deposits for agricultural loans, although these types of restraints are becoming less binding. 60  BIS Papers No 23
 
Table 1 
Targets of central banks and institutional aspects (as at late 2003) 










China  Low inflation, 
growth 
MPC Quarterly  O/n rate, money 
base 
1-year deposit rate, 
reserve requirement 
Hong Kong SAR  Exchange rate
1 EFAC  Monthly  Exchange  rate
1 Base  rate 
India  Price stability, 
growth 
CB board committee  Weekly  O/n rate  Liquidity adjustment 
facility rate 
Indonesia       Base money 
(soon o/n rate) 
 
Korea 2.5-3.5%  inflation
2  MPC  Monthly  O/n call rate  Target o/n rate 
Malaysia Exchange  rate
1  CB board  Monthly  O/n rate  3-month interest rate 
Philippines 4-5%  inflation
2  Monetary board  Monthly  O/n rate  Repo rates 
Singapore  Price stability  MIPM (like an MPC)  Weekly  Effective 
exchange rate 
FX interventions 
Thailand  0-3.5% inflation  MPC  Monthly  2-week repo rate  Policy rate 
Argentina Inflation
3     Money  base   
Brazil 4±2.5%  inflation
2  MPC  Monthly  O/n repo rate   Target o/n repo rate 
Chile  2-4% inflation  CB board  Monthly  O/n rate  Monetary policy rate 
Colombia 3%  inflation
2  CB board    O/n rate  Lombard rate 
Mexico  3±1% inflation  CB board  Fortnightly  Bank reserves  Bank reserves target 
Peru  2.5±1% inflation  CB board    O/n rate  Benchmark rates 
Venezuela       Short-term  rate   
Czech Republic  2-4% inflation
2  CB board  Monthly  1-2 week rate  2-week repo rate 
Hungary 2%  inflation
2  Monetary council   Fortnightly  3-month rate  2-week deposit rate 
Poland 2.5±1%  inflation
2  MPC  Monthly  2-week rate  14-day reference rate 
Russia 5.5-7.5%  inflation
2  MPC    Monetary base  2-week refinance rate 
Algeria         Required reserve 
ratio 
Israel 1-3%  inflation  Governor
4 Monthly  O/n,  weekly  rate   
Saudi Arabia  Exchange rate
1  Senior management    O/n rate  Repo rate
5 
South Africa  3-6% inflation  MPC  6 times/year  O/n rate  O/n repo rate 
Turkey <10%  inflation
2  MPC  Monthly  Base money  Discount rate 
Australia  2-3% inflation  CB board  Monthly  O/n rate  Target o/n rate 
Canada 1-3%  inflation  Governor
4  8 times/year  O/n rate  Target o/n rate 
Euro area  <2% inflation  CB board  Fortnightly
6  O/n rate  Min repo bid rate 
Japan >0  inflation?  Operational 
committee 
Fortnightly  O/n rate  Bank reserves target 
Sweden  2±1% inflation  CB board  Fortnightly  O/n rate  Repo rate 
Switzerland  0-2% inflation  CB board  Quarterly 3-month  Libor  Target  Libor 
United Kingdom  2.5% inflation  MPC  Monthly  Short-term rates  2-week repo rate 
United States  Low inflation, 
growth 
FOMC (an MPC)  8 times/year  O/n rate  Target o/n rate 
Note: CB  =  central bank; EFAC  =  Exchange Fund Advisory Committee; FOMC  =  Federal Open Market Committee; 
MIPM = Monetary and Investment Policy Meeting; MPC = Monetary Policy Committee/Council; o/n = overnight. 
1  Against  US  dollar.   
2  Currently  has  higher  interim  target.   
3    Target to be set in 2004.     
4    Advised by a committee.    
5  Largely follows US federal funds rate.   
6  Normally only changes monetary policy settings at first meeting of month. 
Sources: Central banks; JPMorgan Chase. 
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There are also circumstances under which market-based operating procedures may not work well. For 
example, such procedures require that the bank reserves market is reasonably liquid and efficient and 
that there is a liquid market (government securities, repos or perhaps foreign exchange) in which the 
central bank can trade to affect bank reserves. These issues are taken up further in Section 4. In some 
economies, the banking system may be “shell-shocked” after a banking crisis, and may concentrate 
almost exclusively on managing its large stock of non-performing loans and rebuilding capital. Such 
banks often buy government securities rather than lend to the private sector. And heavily indebted 
companies become more reluctant to borrow. In such circumstances bank credit may be insensitive to 
movements in policy interest rates. 
Interest rates or quantities in the bank reserves market? 
The choice between monetary aggregates and interest rates has long been a matter of debate among 
economists. The classic conclusion is that sticking to a money aggregate will stabilise the economy if 
shocks come from the real economy (that is, the IS curve) but sticking to an interest rate target is 
preferable if shocks affect the demand for money (see Poole (1970)). Nowadays, most central banks 
choose to target interest rates rather than quantities (Table 1). Interest rate changes normally have a 
clear effect on the cost of credit, with bank loan interest rates often immediately following changes in 
the operating target. For an economy with a fixed exchange rate and an open capital account, such as 
Saudi Arabia, a short-term interest rate is the natural target as it can be set with respect to the foreign 
interest rate; see Al-Jasser and Banafe (1999). Interest rate moves can be readily compared with 
market expectations embedded in the yield curve (discussed further in Section 5), which is not the 
case with a quantity target. 
There are still some recent cases of targeting quantities. The Bank of Thailand’s country paper 
describes how, for a short while after the 1997 crisis led to the abandonment of its implicit fixed 
exchange rate, the Bank set daily and quarterly money base targets. But it soon found that radical 
changes in the financial system undermined the relationship between base targets and broader money 
aggregates, and in turn macroeconomic objectives. 
Mexico’s central bank pursues a (negative) bank reserves target. As the banks are short of funds, this 
amount is known as the “corto” (a “short position”). When the central bank tightens monetary policy it 
increases its target for this borrowing so that at least some banks will end up with a costly overdraft at 
the central bank that will put upward pressure on interest rates; see Bank of Mexico (2003). A quantity 
target may operate as a less strict interest rate target. In the short term, greater variation would be 
tolerated in interest rates to reduce the variation in financial quantities or in the exchange rate resulting 
from shocks; see Ortiz (2000) and Schaechter (2001). It has been argued that, in Mexico, the strong 
role of the exchange rate in inflation and inflationary expectations, allied with the relatively small role of 
banks in providing credit to the private sector, mean that a system which reduced exchange rate 
volatility, even at the expense of higher volatility in short-term interest rates, would be preferable. 
However, Ortiz (2000) refers to a “not-so-distant future” when inflationary expectations will be 
anchored by the inflation target, and so will react less to exchange rate movements. Long-term debt 
markets will then be more developed. At this time, Mexico’s central bank will move to using an interest 
rate as its operating target/instrument. Marcos (1999) interprets the corto as a signalling arrangement, 
arguing that the size of the corto is minimal relative to banks’ overall funding but announced changes 
have a large effect on interest rates. 
Quantity targeting is sometimes required by IMF programmes.
3 It may be used by central banks 
judged to lack credibility, at least as a transitional regime. Quantity targeting can also be useful when 
the overnight interest rate has been cut to zero; see Section 3. 
                                                       
3  For example, the loan agreement between Thailand and the IMF after the 1997 crisis set a ceiling on net domestic assets of 
the central bank, putting an upper limit on the monetary base. This is becoming less common. The country paper by the 
Central Bank of Brazil describes how, when Brazil adopted inflation targeting in 1999, it persuaded the IMF to phase out the 
ceiling on net domestic assets as a performance criterion in favour of a formal consultation mechanism based on the 
inflation target. This has now become a common practice. Although the IMF is still pressing Argentina and Turkey to keep 
the broad monetary base within a varying corridor, this is likely to be replaced by an inflation targeting regime in due course. 
See Blejer et al (2001). 62  BIS Papers No 23
 
Overnight or medium-term interest rates? 
If a nominal interest rate is the operational target, the next question is, which interest rate? The 
overnight rate in the bank reserves market is the most common choice (Table 1), as it is usually the 
rate the central bank can control most easily. But some central banks hesitate to focus exclusively on 
the overnight rate as short-lived fluctuations may be misinterpreted as a change in monetary policy. 
However, unintended fluctuations are now generally quite small. Looking at average absolute daily 
changes in the overnight interest rate, these are now only around 10 basis points in the median 
emerging economy. This reflects the impact of structural reforms, such as floating currencies and 
tender systems for selling government debt, and greater experience in conducting market operations; 
see Stebbing (2003). Also, it is now general practice to announce changes in the policy stance so 
unintended fluctuations are less likely to be misinterpreted. 
In other cases, the concern may be that movements in overnight interest rates are not well connected 
to movements at longer maturities that are more relevant to consumption and investment decisions. In 
some economies banks tie loan rates to overnight rates (eg Brazil, Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
the United States), while in others medium-term rates are the benchmark (eg Hungary, Mexico, the 
United Kingdom). However, this argument may be circular. Once a rate is chosen by the central bank 
as its policy focus, it is more likely to be used as a benchmark: see Canada’s experience as described 
in Borio (1997). 
What style of operating procedure? 
Central banks with an interest rate target like to keep fluctuations in short-term interest rates relatively 
low.
4 In a perfect market, having an averaging period for reserves might be enough to keep rates 
smooth.
5 But in practice the market does not work quite this well. The market for bank reserves is 
subject to various shocks (described in Annex A) to which the central bank responds (see Annex B). 
The central bank signals its monetary stance and supports this by structures or operations which keep 
the market-clearing interest rate close to the announced target. There are two main styles of monetary 
policy operating procedures. The “corridor” approach (or as Issing et al (2001) call it, the “European” 
style) has three key features: a corridor bounded by two administered rates set by the central bank; 
use of occasional market operations (repos or collateralised loans); and reserve requirements with 
averaging to smooth short-term interest rates. The “active” approach (“Fed” or “hands on” style as 
Bartolini and Prati (2003) call it) has a smaller role for reserve requirements while involving daily or 
more frequent market operations, and uses standing facilities operating primarily as a “safety valve” for 
individual banks (BIS (1997)). Among emerging economies, central European central banks and the 
Reserve Bank of India operate more in the corridor style. In contrast, many East Asian central banks, 
Brazil and South Africa are closer to the active approach. In January 2003, the US Federal Reserve 
moved some way from the active approach in the direction of the corridor approach. 
                                                       
4  As medium-term interest rates reflect expectations of future movements in short-term rates, central banks have more 
influence over medium-term rates when short-term rates give a clear signal. More orderly market conditions may make the 
transmission mechanism quicker and more predictable. Moreover, it should assist in the quest for financial stability by 
making it easier for financial institutions to assess and manage risks. Excessive volatility in money markets may feed 
uncertainty about economic fundamentals. Failure to keep overnight rates near the announced target may adversely affect 
the overall reputation of the central bank, especially if interest volatility is seen as a symptom of misallocation of liquidity 
among banks and uncertainty about monetary policy. Furthermore, interest volatility blurs signals from the market. 
5  If banks expect interest rate fluctuations during the averaging period, they will try to purchase reserves when rates are “low” 
and sell when they are “high”, which should have the effect of smoothing interest rates over the averaging period (an effect 
sometimes referred to as the “martingale property”). BIS Papers No 23  63
 
3. Operating  procedures  in exceptional circumstances 
In normal times central banks deal with modest shocks to the bank reserves markets, of which 
movements in government deposits are often the most unpredictable.
6 However, operating procedures 
that work best in normal times are not necessarily optimal in exceptional circumstances. Emerging 
economies with floating exchange rates may face what has been termed “sudden stops” in capital 
inflows. Those with fixed exchange rates may be subject to speculative attacks. In both of these 
exceptional cases, the authorities may wish to drive short-term interest rates up to very high levels for 
a short period. The challenge is to moderate how much higher overnight rates pass through into 
medium-term interest rates which affect domestic economic activity. 
Such concerns might lead central banks following an “active” approach to target a medium-term (say 
somewhere between two weeks and three months) interest rate which might be thought relevant to 
most domestic borrowers. This might allow high overnight rates to support the currency in foreign 
exchange markets with a limited effect on domestic demand. For central banks using a “corridor” 
approach, it may be necessary to raise or suspend the top of the corridor for a short period. In some 
cases, central banks may judge it worth sacrificing some clarity in policy in order to maintain greater 
flexibility. The absence of a strong link between overnight rates and longer-term rates may, however, 
also have certain advantages. 
Following the 1997 Asian crisis and the 2001 terrorist attacks, the Singaporean authorities temporarily 
widened the (undisclosed) bands within which they allow the effective exchange rate to vary. Three 
other cases of responses to exceptional circumstances are considered below. 
Hong Kong SAR’s response to the “double play” 
An exceptional shock may require operations outside the usual financial markets. After the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, Hong Kong’s currency board came under a speculative attack. A few highly 
leveraged hedge funds used a “double play”, taking short positions against both the currency (futures) 
and equity markets. If the authorities had abandoned the currency board arrangement, the first 
position would have been profitable. If instead the authorities had maintained the currency board, 
interest rates would have been driven up, equity prices would have fallen and so the second position 
would have been profitable. Initially these tactics worked as interest rates were driven very high. But 
the authorities made a dramatic and unexpected move in August 1998, making very large purchases 
in the equity market which made the short positions unprofitable. This was a very controversial move 
at the time, and was seen by many as inconsistent with Hong Kong’s long-nurtured reputation for free 
markets. However, it was successful: the linked exchange rate was maintained, interest rates fell back 




From early to mid-2002 international investor sentiment about Latin American economies deteriorated, 
as reflected in bond spreads and exchange rate depreciations. The latter threatened to push inflation 
well above targets. The responses of the authorities in the various economies differed, in part due to 
differences in their operating procedures but also in part because the shocks, transmission 
mechanisms and preferences of the authorities differed across the various economies. 
                                                       
6  Table B4 in Annex B shows that this seems true regardless of the openness of the economy or other differences. See the 
paper in this volume by Mihaljek for further discussion. 
7  As many of the acquired shares were sold off by being parcelled up in a “tracker fund” (which operated like a passive unit 
trust), a higher proportion of the equity market is probably now held by domestic retail investors than before the crisis. 64  BIS Papers No 23
 
Mexico announces policy in terms of quantities. The Mexican authorities initially did not adjust the 
“corto” from April-June 2002 as short-term interest rates rose (Graph 1).
8 This could be taken as an 
implicit signal that they viewed the move in interest rates (at least the direction) as appropriate to avoid 
inflation rising excessively. From late 2002 to early 2003 the Mexican authorities explicitly signalled a 
desire for tighter monetary conditions by making the “corto” tighter. This was thought to be appropriate 
as inflation had exceeded the 2002 target and did not appear to be heading down towards the lower 
2003 target. From April 2003 short-term interest rates fell sharply as inflation fell. This raised an issue 
of communication: there had been no explicit signal by the central bank that it wanted easier monetary 
conditions. However, the lack of any subsequent adjustment in the corto suggested that the 




































■ Target inflation rate
1  In percentages.   2  Annual percentage changes.   3  In peso.   4  Peso per US dollars.
Graph 1
Mexico: financial indicators
Overnight interest rate1 Consumer price inflation2
Liquidity restriction: Corto3 Exchange rate4
 
                                                       
8  By contrast, in Brazil, already very high interest rates were eased slightly. While in February 2002 consensus forecasts for 
inflation were very similar for Mexico and Brazil (4% for 2002 and 5% for 2003), by August they were significantly higher in 
Brazil but unchanged in Mexico. It was only in late 2002, when inflation rose sharply, that Brazil tightened monetary policy. BIS Papers No 23  65
 
Japan 
The Bank of Japan responded to a sluggish economy by cutting interest rates in the second half of the 
1990s. By 1999 overnight rates were virtually zero, but deflation meant that real interest rates were still 
positive and there were few signs of a sustained recovery. In March 2001 the Bank adopted new 
operating procedures by setting a target for bank reserves with the central bank. It was initially set at 
JPY 5 trillion, which was steadily increased to JPY 27-32 trillion by late 2003. Interest rates stayed 
near zero but consumer prices continued to fall. Recently the authorities said they would maintain this 
stance until the deflation ended. 
4.  Improving liquidity to make operating procedures more effective 
The greater reliance on financial markets, now more open to international influences, raises the issue 
of what a central bank can do to encourage liquid and efficient markets in both bank reserves and the 
security/instrument with which it transacts with banks. 
Liquidity of the bank reserves market 
The central bank will most readily be able to use the bank reserves market to influence overall 
financial market conditions when this market operates smoothly. Yet there are often various 
impediments to liquidity in this market. Van ’t dack (1999) notes that taxation of interbank transactions 
in Colombia, a high degree of unofficial dollarisation in Peru and regional segmentation of interbank 
markets in Russia all led to less liquid interbank markets. There have also been cases where 
previously liquid markets dried up during crises. 
On the one hand, liquidity may be enhanced by allowing broad access to the market. On the other 
hand, the bank reserves market may operate best when there is little doubt about the credit standing 
of all participants. For this reason it is usually limited to banks subject to licensing and supervision. 
Liquidity of domestic bond and repo markets 
While central banks can still employ market operations by controlling the primary issue of either 
government or their own securities (Table B2 in Annex B), liquid secondary markets are preferable: 
see Stebbing (2003). This is one reason central banks have encouraged them; see the paper by 
Chung in this volume. 
Government securities markets are now reasonably liquid in most emerging economies, although 
often less so than in advanced economies. Measures that may improve liquidity include governments 
issuing bonds even when running large surpluses; avoiding locking up a large proportion of 
government paper in mandatory holdings by banks and insurance companies to meet prudential 
requirements; shorter settlement cycles, which is facilitated by having “dematerialised” securities 
(ie computer entries rather than physical scrip); central counterparties and real-time gross settlement 
(RTGS); better infrastructure for clearing and settlement; standardised conventions and master 
agreements; proper supervision of markets and participants; allowing short-selling; establishing 
benchmarks; developing associated derivatives markets; minimising taxes on transactions; a liberal 
approach to participation by foreign banks in domestic financial markets; steady and predictable 
primary issuance and encouraging a wider investor base (such as by development of funds managers 
such as pension funds and unit trusts); see Mohanty (2002). Some of these areas are admittedly 
outside the direct purview of central banks. 
Alternatively, the central bank could issue its own paper. Such paper constitutes around half the 
central bank’s liabilities in Korea and over a fifth in Hong Kong SAR, Hungary, Mexico and Poland. 
This may be desirable where secondary markets are undeveloped, as operating in primary markets 
mixes monetary and debt management. The Hong Kong Monetary Authority issued its own paper as 
the government had no debt and the Authority wanted to develop the bond market and establish a 
benchmark yield curve. In Mexico, the central bank wanted longer-term paper than the government 
wanted to issue. However, one problem associated with the central bank issuing paper is that it might 
not earn enough returns on its assets (principally foreign reserves) to cover the interest paid on them, 
leading to losses. In Chile, the central bank issued promissory notes in the 1990s to fund accumulation 66  BIS Papers No 23
 
of international reserves associated with intervention intended to hold back the peso’s appreciation. 
The resultant interest expenses are still causing losses. In some economies (eg the Philippines, 
Poland), the central bank ceased issuing its own securities after the government reversed its previous 
opposition to the use of its own securities for market operations. There are some plausible arguments 
against having both government and central bank paper on issue. Splitting the public sector paper 
market between government and central bank paper makes both less liquid; McCauley (2003) 
therefore advocates the government issuing more bonds than it needs for its own financing and 
placing deposits with the central bank. 
As central banks increasingly use repos rather than outright transactions (Table B2), liquidity in the 
repo market will become the more important factor, but many of the considerations mentioned above 
still apply. 
5.  Extracting information about market expectations 
Financial markets offer potentially useful information for central banks as they summarise the views of 
market players who have strong incentives to have well informed opinions. Unlike much other 
information, market prices are available immediately and are not revised. While even unbiased 
expectations may be poor predictors, they will be useful indicators of sentiment.
9 Central banks need 
to know about market expectations of short-term rates in order to assess the likely impact of a policy 
change.
10 This argues for market operations being concentrated in short maturities so that the longer 
maturities continue to provide information about market expectations. 
The term structure of government securities may be most useful for assessing policy expectations 
over the longer term and the credibility of the policy regime. Private sector debt instruments (including 
interest rate swaps, interbank credits and certificates of deposit) have the problem that it can be hard 
to distinguish credit spreads from monetary policy expectations. Interest rate futures only refer to fixed 
expiry dates (and so may not be useful for measuring very short-term expectations) and are often 
illiquid for contracts beyond a few months. This information may be supplemented by a market survey 
of economists (the Bank of England’s survey asks for probability distributions from individual 
respondents, and so gives measures of both the divergence of opinions and the strength with which 
individuals hold their opinions). 
Simple interpretations (eg measuring the one-year bond yield expected to prevail in a year’s time by 
subtracting the current yield on a one-year bond from twice that on a two-year bond) abstract from the 
risk premium on longer-term assets, and the liquidity premia on less traded assets. If these premia are 
sufficiently small, as they usually are for repos, they can be ignored. If they are constant, then changes 
in expectations can be readily identified even if not the expectations themselves. However, changes in 
risk aversion, or perceptions of risk, may lead to significant changes in risk premia. Söderlind and 
Svensson (1997) find there is little evidence of constant risk premia over short horizons, based on their 
experience with Swedish, UK and US data. Yields may also be affected by differences in the taxation 
of different instruments, as noted in the paper by Chung in this volume. 
A probability distribution of future interest rates and exchange rates can be extracted from option 
prices, assuming risk neutrality; see the paper by Chui et al in this volume.
11 A problem with their 
construction, especially in emerging economies, is that options are often thinly traded, particularly 
when their strike price is far away from the current future price and when they have a long maturity. 
                                                       
9  For example, in Hong Kong SAR the authorities know the exchange rate will stay very close to the link rate but futures and 
options prices give information on market sentiment towards the exchange rate. 
10  This is not to say the central bank should necessarily follow these expectations. This is of course an old debate. The 
Federal Reserve’s failure to follow market expectations (which were apparently based on one newspaper column) of a 
further cut in the federal funds rate in mid-2003 was rather perversely followed by criticism of the Federal Reserve rather 
than of the failed predictions in the market; see Baum (2003). 
11  The Bank of Israel has issued small amounts of foreign exchange options specifically to derive such information. BIS Papers No 23  67
 
When both indexed and non-indexed bonds are issued and heavily traded, this can give a good 
measure of inflationary expectations. The paper by Sokoler in this volume reports on the use of 
information as an important input to policy decisions, and if necessary as a means of justifying to the 
government the need for tight monetary policy. Indexed bonds tend to be most useful for measuring 
medium-term expectations as longer-term indexed securities are generally bought and held by 
institutional investors. There may be a selection bias, however, in that indexed securities will be 
bought by investors with higher than average inflationary expectations. It is also not obvious whether 
an indexed bond should have a higher or lower risk premium. All this suggests that use of this 
approach may provide a better measure of changes in inflationary expectations than in the level. 
If the central bank is to extract information about market expectations from traded instruments, it must 
ensure its own transactions do not dominate the market. Transactions using repos do not directly 
affect prices in the bond market. Similarly, swap transactions in a liquid market do not as a rule directly 
affect the exchange rate.
12 
As domestic financial markets in emerging economies become more globalised, international factors 
increasingly influence them, reducing their information content. Graph 1 in Anderson and Moreno’s 
contribution to this volume shows that for many economies, movements in bond yields and equity 
prices closely follow those in major economies. This suggests that they may give relatively little 
information about domestic conditions and prospects. This issue deserves further investigation. 
                                                       
12  Swap rates may be becoming more useful than bond yields as an indicator of interest rate expectations; see Reinhart and 
Sack (2002) and Clerc et al (2002) for conflicting views on this. 68  BIS Papers No 23
 
Annex A:  
The demand for, and supply of, bank reserves 
Banks hold funds in accounts with the central bank, known as “bank reserves”, to facilitate settlement 
of transactions by bank customers or because they are required to hold reserves by the central bank. 
Settlement balances 
Banks almost always settle transactions between each other on the books of the central bank, for 
many reasons.
13 First, it may be compulsory, as in Canada. Second, the central bank is almost 
universally regarded as the safest counterparty. Third, banks may not want a rival organisation to gain 
more information about their operations. Finally, the central bank may provide routine intraday or 
overnight credit and possible emergency liquidity assistance. See CPSS (2003) for more discussion. 
Settlement balances have a high (opportunity) cost when, as is generally the case, they bear no 
interest. Banks will still aim to hold sufficient balances to avoid the penalties that arise if they cannot 
meet their obligations at the end of the day. 
Reserve requirements 
Banks are usually required to place a minimum amount of bank reserves with the central bank in 
proportion to their customers’ deposits (Table A1). The fact that Australia, Hong Kong SAR, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom have successfully operated monetary policy without such 
requirements shows they are not essential. But they may facilitate monetary operations. Reserve 
requirements may also be a way of charging banks for the services provided to them by the central 
bank, sometimes have prudential motives or boost central bank independence by giving it a source of 
revenue, and were formerly a monetary policy tool in their own right; see Nel (2000). 
Some economies apply differing reserve requirements to differing types of deposits. In the United 
States this has led to a decline in required reserves as “sweep programmes” automatically transfer 
depositors’ funds from reservable to non-reservable accounts; see Krieger (2002). There are also 
differences in what counts in meeting reserve requirements. Some economies include vault cash, and 
in South Africa it accounts for half the required reserves.
14 
Reserve requirements can help smooth overnight interest rates if they are specified as a fortnightly or 
monthly average rather than needing to be met every day, and if it is possible to use the reserve 
requirement holdings to meet settlement needs. This is especially desirable in less developed financial 
systems where interbank markets are less liquid and long and variable lags in the clearing and 
settlement systems lead to uncertainty about the timing of future settlements. However, averaging may 
also reduce the need for banks to trade in the interbank market and so hamper its development. 
The demand for reserves will be harder to predict if reserve requirements are related to the current 
level of bank liabilities. For this reason most central banks build in a lag between the calculation period 
and the required holding period. A desire to reduce uncertainty about required reserves led the 
US Federal Reserve in 1998 to reinstate the lag in reserve requirements it had removed in 1984. 
                                                       
13  There have been exceptions. Prior to December 1996 banks in Hong Kong SAR settled on the books of HSBC, the largest 
bank in the economy. The Monetary Authority had an account with HSBC and from July 1988 imposed rules (the 
“accounting arrangements”) to give the Authority a degree of power over monetary conditions. In the United Kingdom many 
small banks settle on the books of larger banks (the “settlement banks”) which themselves have accounts at the central 
bank. 
14  There are security risks and additional transport costs if banks are encouraged to move cash back to the central bank and it 
may arguably give an unfair benefit to banks located close to the central bank; Borio (1997) and Van der Merwe (1999). 
However, allowing too much vault cash to count for reserve requirements may lead to an accumulation of soiled banknotes 
in circulation; Park (2002). Vault cash is a rising proportion of required reserves in the United States and many banks are 
able to meet their reserve requirements exclusively from it. Germany excluded vault cash in 1995 partly to avoid this. 
Hungary stopped allowing vault cash to count in July 2000, as part of aligning its requirements to those of the ECB. BIS Papers No 23  69
 
Table A1 
Rules on banks’ required reserves (as at late 2003) 
Averaging period 









deposits with CB plus 
China  6%  1.9%  10 days    Vault cash 
India  4.5%  Bank rate (on 
part over 3%) 
2 weeks  2 weeks  None 
Indonesia 5%  None  None  2  weeks  None 
Korea  1-5%, avg 3%  None  2 weeks  1 week  Vault cash (up to 35%) 
Malaysia  4%  None  2 weeks  2 weeks  None 
Philippines  17%  4% (on 40% of 
reserves) 
1 week  1 week  Vault cash and government securities
(up to 75%) 
Singapore  3%  None  2 weeks  2 weeks  None 
Thailand  6%  None  2 weeks  2 weeks  Vault cash (up to 2.5% points) 
Argentina 22-40%  Federal  funds 
– 20 bp 





1  Vault cash (up to 33%) 
Chile 3.6-9%  Half  previous 
month’s 
inflation  
1 month  None  Vault cash 
Colombia 2.5-13%  Yes
2  15 days  8 days  Vault cash 
Mexico Zero
3 None  28  days  .  . 
Peru  6% (20% fc)  None  1 month  None  Vault cash 
Venezuela  15%  None  1 week  1 week  None 
Czech 
Republic  2%  Repo rate  1 month  2 days  None 
Hungary 5%  Below  market
4  1 month  1 month  None 
Poland  4.5%  None  1 month  1 day  Vault cash (limited) 
Russia  7-10%  None  20 days  1 month  Vault cash 
Algeria 4.25%         
Israel  0-6%  None 1  month None  Vault  cash 
Saudi Arabia  7% (demand); 
2% (time) 
None None  15  days  None 
South Africa  2.5%  None  1 month  15 business 
days 
25% of vault cash
5 
Turkey  6% (11% fc)  Yes  2 weeks  2 weeks  None 
        
Euro area  2%
6  Market rate  1 month
7  24 days  None 
Japan  0.05-1.2%  None  1 month  Partly lagged  None 
United States  3-10%  None  2 weeks  2 weeks  Vault cash 
Note: fc = foreign currency. Hong Kong SAR, Australia, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom have no required reserves 
(although the United Kingdom has a 0.15% cash ratio deposit to finance some of the central bank’s costs). Canada has a zero 
reserve requirement. 
1  Brazil has different reserve requirements for eight types of deposits.   
2  75-100% of inflation target.   
3  Allows overdrafts in 
bank reserves; also has system of “compulsory deposits”.   
4  Rising to market rates by May 2004.   
5  Being phased out; none 
will count by August 2004.   
6  Deposits <2 years.   
7  From 2004 will change to an irregular period of 28 to 46 days to align with 
meetings of the ECB Council; see ECB (2003). 
Main sources: Nel (2000); questionnaires from the 1998, 2002 and 2003 Deputy Governors’ Meetings. 
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Trends in reserve requirements 
Reserve ratios impose a form of “seigniorage” tax on banks, which tends to be higher in emerging 
economies than in advanced economies; see Hawkins (2003, Table 3). Concerns that this tax may be 
reducing intermediation or redirecting it away from banks has led central banks to seek to reduce their 
reserve requirements (and averaging itself reduces the burden of reserve requirements (Table A2)). 




Bank reserves as a percentage of bank deposits 
  Dec 1980  Dec 1990  Dec 2000  June 2003 (or latest) 
Emerging Asia
1 14  12  8  8 
Latin America
2 30  20  13  21 
Central and eastern Europe
3 ...  17
4 17  11 
Africa and Middle East
5 56  13  11  11 
United States  6  4  2  2 
Selected other advanced economies
6 8  2  2  1 
1    Unweighted average of India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.     
2  Unweighted 
average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.   
3  Unweighted average of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Russia.     
4  End-1993.   
5    Unweighted average of Algeria, Israel, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and 
Turkey.   
6  Unweighted average of Australia, Canada and Switzerland. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, line 20 as a percentage of the sum of lines 24 and 25. 
 
Nowadays emerging economies rarely vary reserve requirements to affect financial conditions, 
although there are still some cases. Argentina lowered reserve requirements to ease monetary policy 
when its currency board framework prevented it from lowering interest rates, Brazil raised 
requirements when its currency was under pressure in 2002 and China raised them in August 2003 to 
restrict bank lending. 
The supply of bank reserves 
The supply of bank reserves can be analysed by rearranging the central bank’s balance sheet. 
 
Central bank balance sheet 
Liabilities Assets 
Foreign liabilities  FL  Foreign assets  FA 
Currency C     
Bank reserves  R     
Deposits by government  GD  Lending to government  GL 
Other liabilities and capital  OL  Other assets (including lending to banks)  OA 
 
This gives:   R = (FA – FL) + (GL – GD) – C + (OA – OL) 
and taking changes  ∆R = ∆F + ∆G – ∆C + ∆NOA. 
This is a simplification in some ways. For example, some changes in the government’s accounts with 
the central bank have their counterpart in changes in central bank capital (ie ∆G is offset by ∆NOA) 
rather than affecting the bank reserves market. BIS Papers No 23  71
 
Foreign assets 
Foreign exchange intervention is generally not a major source of variability in the bank reserves 
market (other than during crises) in advanced economies; see Borio (1997). Given the standard 
two-day settlement lag for foreign exchange transactions, this component is known with certainty 
within the horizon of daily operations. However, emerging economies, even those eschewing formal 
pegs, more commonly engage in foreign exchange intervention, and sometimes in large amounts; see 
the paper by Mohanty in this volume for further information. 
Currency 
Currency fluctuations are sometimes erratic, and there can be large seasonal fluctuations around 
Christmas, Easter and Chinese New Year. There is often a within-week pattern of increases before 
public holidays as consumers withdraw cash and subsequent decreases as shops bank their receipts. 
Generally, the fluctuation in the demand for notes has no effect on the policy rate as these fluctuations 
tend to net out over the year. In countries recovering from high inflation, however, longer-term 
currency increases may be significant. 
Government transactions 
Central banks report that net government deposits are the hardest component to predict (see 
Table  B4) even now that few central banks lend to governments. The complications raised by 
transactions with government are discussed in the paper by Mihaljek in this volume. 72  BIS Papers No 23
 
Annex B: 
Monetary policy operating procedures 
Monetary policy operating procedures encompass both standing facilities, which allow banks to initiate 
transactions with the central bank, and market operations undertaken by the central bank. Both can 
play an important role in keeping interest rates at desired levels. 
Standing facilities 
Central banks pursuing a corridor approach bound the overnight interest rate by providing standing 
deposit and lending facilities.
15 Table B1 lists these facilities while Graph B1 provides an illustrative 
example of their operation. The Czech experience shows three possible responses to a corridor: the 
overnight rate being bound by it, varying significantly within it, and keeping close to its midpoint.
16 
Access to the lending or credit facility (often termed “lombard” or “discount window”) is sometimes 
restricted.
17 Obviously, collateralised credit facilities are restricted by the holdings of eligible paper. 
Some central banks charge more for loans beyond a certain amount (Chile, Hong Kong SAR, Israel). 
The deposit facility will not offer an attractive return in order to avoid it being used too often. In the 
Philippines the central bank tiers the interest rates it pays; as of July 2003 it paid 6.75% on the first 











2000 2001 2002 2003
Lending facility rate2
Overnight rate          
Deposit facility rate3
1  In percentages.   2  Lombard rate.   3  Discount rate.
Sources: Bloomberg; national data.
Graph B1
Czech Republic: Central bank lending and deposit facility rates1
 
 
                                                       
15  Central bank loans to banks, often at below market interest rates, had been used for financing priority industries or smaller 
companies in many emerging economies, but this “policy lending” has now largely disappeared. 
16  The reduced volatility since early 2002 reflects a longer reserve maintenance period and the setting of the two-week repo 
rate at the midpoint of the deposit and lombard rates, both moves bringing Czech procedures in line with those of the ECB. 
17  As in the United States until early 2003, Korea’s central bank sets the interest rate on its loan facility below its target for the 
cash rate but discourages banks from accessing liquidity adjustment loans too frequently. A 100 basis point premium is 
charged to banks that borrow for three consecutive months and The Bank of Korea inspects the financial condition of banks 
making frequent use of the facility; see Park (2002). The loans are also subject to an aggregate ceiling within which 
individual banks are allocated a quota. BIS Papers No 23  73
 
Table B1 
Standing facilities (as at late 2003) 
 
Form of credit 


























China Rediscount  window           
Hong Kong 
SAR  Discount window  None  .
1 CB
2 No No 
Indonesia  FPJP (o/n facility)  Deposit facility    G, CB  Yes  No 
Korea  Temporary credit facility  None  .  G, CB  Yes  No 
Philippines Overnight  lending  Overnight borrowing  225  G  No   
Singapore End-of-day  liquidity 
facility 
   G  Yes  No 
Thailand Liquidity  window  None  .  CB,  G  No  No 
Argentina Rediscount  facility  Yes    G  Yes  No 
Brazil Discount  window  None  .  G  No  No 
Chile  Liquidity credit line  Liquidity deposit facility  100
3 No  No  No 
Colombia  O/n repo  Borrowing auction  100  G  No  No 
Mexico Overdraft  None  . G  Yes  No 
Peru  O/n credit facilities  Deposit facility
4  125  CB, G, AAA  Yes  No 
Venezuela Rediscount  facility  None  .  G  No  No 
Czech 
Republic  O/n repo  O/n deposit facility  200  Yes  Yes   
Hungary  O/n collateralised credit  Deposit facility  200  G,C  No  No 
Poland  Lombard loans  Short-term deposits  300  G  No  No 
Russia  O/n collateralised loan  O/n deposits  >1,000  CB, G  No  Yes 
Algeria   Deposit  facility         
Israel Borrowing  facility      G     
Saudi Arabia  Overnight repos  Reverse repos    G  No  No 
South Africa  Final clearing repo  Final clearing reverse 
repo 
300 G,CB     
Turkey Liquidity  window  Bid  facility  600 G  Yes  No 
Australia  Collateralised lending  Interest paid on 
reserves 
50 Yes     
Canada Fixed-term  loan    50  Yes     
Euro area  Marginal lending facility  Marginal deposit facility 200    No  No 
Japan Complementary  lending 
facility 
None  .  Yes Yes No 
United 
Kingdom  Lending facility  Deposit facility  200  Yes  Yes   
United States  Discount window  None  .  Yes  Yes  No 
Note: India and Malaysia have no standing facilities. AAA = AAA-rated entities; CB = central bank; G = government bonds; 
C = investment grade corporate bonds. 
1  Previous deposit facility paid 200 bp less than credit facility in 1992-97 and 300 bp less in 1997-98.   
2  Some HK dollar debt 
issued by quasi-government agencies and multilateral institutions is also accepted.   
3  Rising to 500 for large borrowers.   
4  Both 
new soles and dollars, with the latter more used. 
Source: Central banks. 
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Market operations 
Market operations may be conducted by central banks on a regular but infrequent basis, or a number 
of times a day, depending on whether a corridor or active approach is being used. They fall into five 
general categories: 
•  issue of short-term paper (either the central bank’s own paper or the government’s); 
•  outright transactions in the secondary market; 
•  repurchase transactions (repos) against domestic currency assets. In substance (but not 
legal form) they are equivalent to a collateralised loan. Repos inject liquidity while temporary 
sales (reverse repos) withdraw liquidity; 
•  foreign exchange swaps. These are similar to repos but use foreign currency rather than a 
domestic government bond as the underlying asset. Liquidity can be injected by a spot 
purchase of foreign currency combined with an equivalent forward sale (and withdrawn by a 
spot sale/forward purchase); 
•  interbank market transactions, including taking deposits or making loans. 
Some central banks also use transfers of government deposits as a quasi-market operation. 
Table B2 shows that in both advanced and emerging economies the most widely used instruments are 
repos (and reverse repos), followed by outright purchases and sales of bonds. 
Deciding on the mix of instruments to use depends on many factors: the costs and flexibility of 
transactions, availability of paper and state of the public finances. It may be easier to send clear 
signals to the market if just one or two particularly visible instruments are used, while greater flexibility 
would argue for using a wider range of instruments. Opening up the banking market to foreign banks 
may be more successful if they are presented with instruments and procedures with which they are 
familiar. 
Outright transactions 
Markets for short-term paper may be more commonly used as they are more liquid than those for 
longer-term paper. Government and central bank securities are generally regarded as involving no 
credit risk and thus are easier to use for market operations. (However, in some crises, default may be 
considered a real possibility, which would greatly complicate such operations.) They also avoid 
possible complications from buying private sector paper. Counterparties may try to offload riskier 
paper, and as Axilrod (1995) argues, “the central bank would find it difficult to avoid purchasing at least 
some of the paper; if it refused, the market itself would turn away from the paper on the thought that 
the central bank has access to information unavailable to the market generally (as in practice it may 
well have)”. Well respected credit ratings might help avoid such problems but they are not available in 
all emerging economies. The imprimatur associated with being acceptable to the central bank could 
narrow credit spreads of that class of private sector paper, making them less reflective of their 
underlying risk. Among private issuers, the central bank may prefer to restrict itself to the banks about 
which it is better informed. The choice of paper for market operations may also be affected by changes 
in taxation arrangements, as noted by Bisignano (1996). 
Separation of debt management and monetary management 
The importance of the government “fully funding” its budget (ie issuing sufficient securities to the 
private sector to cover any deficit) and thus giving the central bank effective control over the supply of 
bank reserves is emphasised by Stebbing (2003). This separates monetary and debt management. It 
usually requires the government to auction its bonds. This has the advantage of imposing fiscal 
discipline as the interest rate consequences of high government borrowing are clear. It also makes the 
issue of government debt more predictable. Moreover, it can remove conflicts of interest as the central 
bank might want high interest rates to dampen inflation while the debt manager might prefer low 
interest rates to reduce servicing costs. Countries are increasingly separating these two functions. BIS Papers No 23  75
 
Table B2 
Types of market operations employed (as at late 2003) 




















Percentage of emerging economies 
Employed 68  9  55  82  73  32  41  27  5 
Most 
important  23 0  5  55  5  5  5  0  0 
Country details (most commonly used operations in bold) 
China  Yes          
India     Yes Yes Yes Yes      
Indonesia  Yes        Y e s     
Korea Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes        
Malaysia  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Philippines     Yes Yes  Yes  Yes    
Singapore     Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes   
Thailand Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes       
Argentina  Yes           
Brazil Prohibited    Yes  Yes Yes         
Chile  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes Yes       
Colombia   Yes    Yes  Yes        
Mexico  Yes         Yes   
Peru  Yes     Yes   Yes  Yes    
Venezuela Yes      Yes  Yes        
Czech 
Republic Yes      Yes  Yes        
Hungary  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Poland  Yes   Yes  Yes       
Russia     Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Israel Yes       Yes  Yes  Yes   
Saudi 
Arabia      Yes  Yes      
South 
Africa  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes      
Turkey Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
            
Australia    Yes  Yes   Yes      
Canada      Yes  Yes      Yes 
Euro area      Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes     
Japan     Yes  Yes Yes         
Sweden Yes      Yes Yes      
Switzerland      Yes  Yes  Yes     Yes 
United 
Kingdom   Yes  Yes  Yes   Occasional      
United 
States     Yes Yes Yes        
Sources: Central banks; Economist Intelligence Unit. 
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Auction procedures 
Outright transactions (and other forms of market operations) generally involve some kind of auction. A 
key question is whether to fix volumes or prices. Some central banks prefer to set prices to give a 
clear signal. In practice, fixed rate auctions can mimic variable rate auctions as tendering can be 
frequent and the central bank can adjust the rate from tender to tender in response to the volume 
demanded. Some central banks (such as the Central Bank of Malaysia, the South African Reserve 
Bank and formerly the Deutsche Bundesbank) generally use variable rate auctions but switch to fixed 
rate auctions when they want to send a particularly strong signal to the market. 
A second issue is the auction type. In multiple price auctions (sometimes known as “discriminatory 
price” or “American” auctions), there may be a “winner’s curse”. A bidder may find they have paid too 
much and make a loss in secondary trading. This is avoided in single price auctions, where all 
successful bidders pay the same price (sometimes known as a “uniform price” or “Dutch” auction). So 
while a single price auction may appear to be less attractive to the issuer (as the keenest bidders pay 
less than under a multiple price auction), it may attract more bidding. However, single price auctions 
may provide greater incentives for collusion in thin markets. There are also concerns that a very low 
bid by the marginal successful bidder could set the price, especially in underdeveloped markets where 
there may be few bids relative to the size of the auction. Multiple price auctions appear to be becoming 
more prevalent (as they are for primary auctions of government securities) but single price auctions 
may be better in less developed and illiquid markets where bidders may be more unsure about the 
likely market price. See Mohanty (2002) for further discussion. 
The counterparties allowed to participate in auctions may be limited due to credit risk concerns, 
particularly in the “active” model, under which auctions may be frequent and quick. They have to meet 
certain obligations, such as providing information, offering two-way quotes at limited spreads, or (as in 
Turkey) purchasing minimum quantities of bonds, in exchange for the privilege. As computers reduce 
the logistical difficulties of dealing with a large number of counterparties, there is less reason to have a 
small group of dealers. 
Repurchase transactions 
Repos come in a variety of forms (such as sell/buybacks, securities borrowing, special collateralised 
loans) that are equivalent for monetary policy purposes but reflect the legal and institutional framework 
prevailing in various economies. Repos have become the main policy instrument in many economies. 
No link is necessary between the maturity of the repo and that of the underlying securities, and repo 
transactions do not directly affect prices in the bond market. Features such as amount, maturity, 
frequency, disclosure and tender system can be varied to suit the circumstances. For temporary 
adjustments, a single repo will be cheaper than two outright transactions. Repos allow central banks to 
limit their risk while expanding the range of assets in which they transact. They also have the 
advantage for central banks that injections of liquidity are reversed automatically when they mature. 
Generally, government and central bank paper are eligible for repos (Table B3). In some cases bank 
or other higher-quality private sector paper can be used. Widening the range of acceptable paper may 
be prompted by a desire to develop the secondary market in these securities (as in India) or by the 
fact that the government securities markets are illiquid (as in Israel and Poland). In general the 
maturities of repos are fairly short; often less than two weeks. Central banks in most advanced 
economies mark collateral backing repos to market daily and may require counterparties to post 
additional collateral. 
Foreign exchange swaps 
A foreign exchange swap involves two counterparties exchanging specific amounts of different 
currencies and agreeing to repay at a fixed rate on a fixed date. It is equivalent to a spot purchase of 
foreign exchange and a forward sale. The effect of (say) a purchase by the central bank is to increase 
the sum of domestic currency bank reserves. When domestic securities markets are not broad but the 
foreign exchange market is very liquid, using a swap may be the best way for the central bank to affect 
the level of bank reserves. At the same time, since the spot transaction in foreign exchange is offset 
by the futures transaction, it also avoids exerting a direct influence on the spot exchange rate 
(although there may be a signalling effect). The use of swaps may also help develop a deeper and 
better functioning foreign exchange market; see Hooyman (1993) and Blejer and Schumacher (2001). BIS Papers No 23  77
 
Table B3 
Types of securities used in market operations 


























operations                 
Emerging 
economies  68   63  42   5  16    11    11 
Advanced 
economies  17   83  17   17  33    50    33 
Repo 
operations                
Emerging 
economies  70   90  60   5  25    5    0 
Advanced 
economies  25   100  13   88  88    75    75 
1  Maturity up to 12 months.   
2  Original maturity over 12 months. 
Source: Central banks. 
 
However, there are risks in their use. The value of the underlying asset - foreign exchange - may be 
volatile, which may lead the counterparty to default. Extensive use of swaps (and other derivatives) 
may also make the central bank’s published balance sheet misleading. This may tempt the central 
bank to delay monetary policy changes. Foreign exchange swaps involve Herstatt risk when 
transacted across time zones, as one party might not able to receive the counterparty’s currency after 
delivering its own. The creation of the Continuous Linked Settlement Bank should remove this risk for 
those currencies for which it operates. Another problem in some countries is shallow forward markets. 
There may be few counterparties and the market might not be able to generate market prices for 
swaps. The central bank would then be determining the swap rate. 
In Singapore and Switzerland, swaps are the main instruments for monetary policy operations, 
perhaps reflecting the long history of budget surpluses and the large amounts of bonds held until 
maturity by large investors, which tends to lower the liquidity in government bond markets. They have 
also been extensively used in Israel and South Africa. 
Transfer of government deposits 
Movement of government deposits between the central bank and commercial banks is an important 
monetary policy tool in Canada. Similarly, Malaysia has sometimes transferred assets from its 
Employee Provident Fund to the central bank to sterilise capital inflows. Singapore has used its 
Central Provident Fund in a similar manner. In Saudi Arabia, funds of government institutions placed 
with the central bank are sometimes used in a similar way. It is not a market-based technique, and 
does not help develop financial markets; see Quintyn (1994). 78  BIS Papers No 23
 
Table B4 
Aspects of the bank reserves market (as at late 2003) 
 



















China      1 or 2 per week  10  RTGS 
Hong Kong SAR  2 days  C    0  RTGS 
India 1  day  G,C  Daily  5  DTNS
2 
Indonesia 1  week  G  Daily  9  RTGS 
Korea 15-16  days  G  Weekly  4  RTGS 
Malaysia  2 weeks  G  Twice a day  17  RTGS 
Philippines   G Daily  11  RTGS 
Singapore  No formal forecasts  G?    4  RTGS 
Thailand  1 month  G  Twice a day  4  RTGS 
Argentina  3 months  G  Twice a week  21  RTGS 
Brazil 1  month  C,G  Daily  42  RTGS 
Chile  1 month  C  Twice a week  5  DTNS
2 
Colombia  2 weeks  G  Twice a day  7  RTGS 
Mexico 2  months  C  Daily  17  RTGS 
Peru 1  month  C  Weekly  32  DTGS 
Venezuela 1  year  G  Daily  25  DTNS 
Czech Republic  5 days  NOA  Daily  3  RTGS 
Hungary 18  months  G  Weekly  9 RTGS 
Poland Weekly,  monthly  G  Weekly  6  RTGS 
Russia  1 month  G  Twice a day  26  DTGS 
Algeria       10   
Israel 1  month  G  Daily  10  DTNS 
Saudi Arabia    F    7  RTGS 
South Africa  7-30 days  C  Weekly  4  RTGS 
Turkey 2  weeks  C,R  Daily  22  RTGS 
Euro area  10 days    Weekly  ...  RTGS 
United Kingdom  13 weeks (focus on 
next 2) 
C  Twice a day  1  RTGS 
G = government. C = currency. F = net foreign assets. NOA = net other assets. R = bank reserves. RTGS = real-time gross 
settlement. DTNS = deferred time net settlement. DTGS = deferred time gross settlement. 
1  As at June 2003; ratio of line 20 to sum of lines 24 and 25 in IMF International Financial Statistics.   
2  RTGS expected in 
2004. 
Sources: Borio (2001); central banks; CPSS. 
 BIS Papers No 23  79
 
References 
Al-Jasser, M and A Banafe (1999): “Monetary policy instruments and procedures in Saudi Arabia”, BIS 
Policy Papers, no 5, March, pp 203-17. 
Axilrod, S (1995): “Transformation of markets and policy instruments for open market operations”, IMF 
Working Papers, no 95/146, December. 
Bank for International Settlements (1997): “Implementation and tactics of monetary policy”, BIS 
Conference Papers, no 3. 
Bank of Mexico (2003): Implementation of monetary policy through the zero-average reserve 
requirement system, Bank of Mexico. 
Bartolini, L and A Prati (2003): “The execution of monetary policy: a tale of two central banks”, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, no 165, April. 
Baum, C (2003): “Fed watchers write epitaph, dig grave, jump in”, Bloomberg, 23 June. 
Bisignano, J (1996): “Varieties of monetary policy operating procedures: balancing monetary 
objectives with market efficiency”, BIS Working Papers, no 35, July. 
Blejer, M, A Leone, P Rabanal and G Schwartz (2001): “Inflation targeting in the context of 
IMF-supported adjustment programs”, in N Loayza and R Soto (eds), Inflation targeting: design, 
performance, challenges, Central Bank of Chile, November. (An earlier version appeared as IMF 
Working Papers, no 01/31, March 2001.) 
Blejer, M and L Schumacher (2001): “Central bank use of contingent liabilities”, Central Banking, 
vol XI, no 3, February, pp 76-82. 
Borio, C (1997): “The implementation of monetary policy in industrial countries: a survey”, BIS 
Economic Papers, no 47, July. 
——— (2001): “A hundred ways to skin a cat: comparing monetary policy operating procedures in the 
United States, Japan and the euro area”, BIS Papers, no 9, December, pp 1-22. 
Clerc, L, F Drumetz and F Haas (2002): “The influence of structural changes on market functioning 
and its implications for monetary policy: a focus on the euro area”, BIS Papers, no 12, August, 
pp 43-64. 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2003): The role of central bank money in payment 
systems, August. 
European Central Bank (2003): “Changes to the Eurosystem’s operational framework for monetary 
policy”, ECB Monthly Bulletin, August, pp 41-54. 
Goodhart, C and D Lu (2003): Intervention to save Hong Kong, Oxford University Press. 
Hawkins, J (2003): “Central bank balance sheets and fiscal operations”, BIS Papers, no 20, October, 
pp 71-83. 
Hong Kong Monetary Authority (1995): “Hong Kong dollar interbank market: an analysis of its role in 
financial intermediation”, Hong Kong Monetary Authority Quarterly Bulletin, no 2, February, pp 10-17. 
Hooyman, C (1993): “The use of foreign exchange swaps by central banks: a survey”, IMF Working 
Papers, no 93/64, August. 
Issing, O, V Gaspar, I Angeloni and O Tristani (2001): “The operational framework”, Chapter 8 of their 
book Monetary policy in the euro area: strategy and decision making at the European Central Bank, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Krieger, S (2002): “Recent trends in monetary policy implementation: a view from the desk”, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, May, pp 73-6. 
Marcos, J (1999): “The implementation of monetary policy through the zero-average reserve 
requirement system: the Mexican case”, in BIS Policy Papers, no 5, March, pp 169-85. 
McCauley, R (2003): “Unifying government bond markets in east Asia”, BIS Quarterly Review, 
December, pp 89-98. 80  BIS Papers No 23
 
Mohanty, M (2002): “Improving liquidity in government bond markets: what can be done?”, BIS 
Papers, no 11, June, pp 49-80. 
Nel, H (2000): “Minimum reserve requirements”, South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, 
December, pp 63-72. 
Ortiz, G (2000): “Commentary: how should monetary policymakers react to the new challenges of 
global economic integration”, in Global economic integration: opportunities and challenges, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp 255-87. 
Park, J-H (ed) (2002): Monetary Policy in Korea, Bank of Korea, Seoul. 
Poole, W (1970): “Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 84, no 2, May. 
Quintyn, M (1994): “Government securities versus central bank securities in developing open market 
operations - evaluation and need for coordinating arrangements”, IMF Working Papers, no 94/62, May. 
Reinhart, V and B Sack (2002): “The changing information content of market interest rates”, BIS 
Papers, no 12, August, pp 340-57. 
Schaechter, A (2001): “Implementation of monetary policy and the central bank’s balance sheet”, IMF 
Working Papers, no 01/149, October. 
Söderlind, P and L Svensson (1997): “New techniques to extract market expectations from financial 
instruments”, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol 40, no 2, October, pp 383-429. 
Stebbing, P (2003): “Some technical aspects of a market-based system of monetary management”, 
talk given to the Bank of England Centre for Central Banking Studies, September. 
Van der Merwe, E (1999): “Monetary policy operating procedures in South Africa”, BIS Policy Papers, 
no 5, March, pp 228-57. 
Van ’t dack (1999): “Implementing monetary policy in emerging market economies: an overview of the 
issues”, BIS Policy Papers, no 5, March, pp 3-72. 